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The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that the military often struggles to 
understand the people it attempts to influence. The military tried for years to build 
legitimacy for the host governments, with little success. It has become clear that 
the military fails to understand the determinants of human behavior. This thesis 
demonstrates a way to improve how the military conducts one of the most 
common types of influence operations—building legitimacy—by analyzing past 
influence operations through the reasoned-action approach model, a theory for 
the prediction of human social behavior. This framework is generally well 
regarded in social psychology; many studies have shown its ability to predict and 
understand human social behavior. The results of this thesis suggest that 
influence messages that self-aggrandize the host-nation government are 
ineffective and, in some cases, counterproductive to building legitimacy. 
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In 1934, Professor Richard LaPiere of Stanford University traveled 
extensively around the United States visiting various hotels and restaurants with 
a young Chinese couple.1 The public’s attitude toward Chinese at the time was 
negative, and LaPiere took notes on how the couple was treated. They visited 
250 hotels and restaurants during their tour, but in only one instance were they 
refused service. After the trip, LaPiere wrote the establishments and asked 
whether they would accept members of the Chinese race. The possible 
responses were “yes,” “no,” and “depends on the circumstances.” Of the 128 
replies, 118, or 92 percent, stated they would not accept members of the 
Chinese race in their establishments. This study was the first of many on the gap 
between people’s attitudes and their behavior, demonstrating that factors other 
than attitude are involved in the behavioral decision-making process.2  
In 2012, I served as a psychological operations (PSYOP) planner in 
Afghanistan, developing influence programs at the operational level. Our 
campaigns routinely focused on changing or reinforcing attitudes on key issues, 
ranging from promoting the competency of Afghan security forces to 
delegitimizing the Taliban. Quarterly surveys were conducted quantitatively to 
measure the attitudes of ordinary Afghans over time. Our surveys—as well as 
other surveys conducted by unaffiliated organizations—showed low support for 
the Taliban across most of the country. Yet troops on the ground routinely 
reported active or passive support for the Taliban. Reality seemed to contradict 
the data collected, and I grew curious to why attitudes were not a good predictor 
of behavior.   
                                            1 Christopher J. Armitage and Julie Christian, “From Attitudes to Behavior: Basic and Applied 
Research on the Theory of Planned Behavior,” in Planned Behavior: The Relationship between 
Human Thought and Action, ed. Christopher J. Armitage and Julie Christian (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 2004), 1–2. 
2 Ibid. 
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These examples touch on a persistent problem with current military 
information support operations (MISO) and in influence operations writ large: a 
lack of understanding by influence planners of how human social behavior is 
formed. MISO’s association with marketing and advertising causes many 
planners to focus on changing attitudes as their end goal. But over the past 50 
years, social psychologists have identified determinants of behavior other than 
attitude that must be taken into account. 
In 1980, Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen proposed a new model for the 
prediction of behavior and behavioral intention, called the theory of reasoned 
action (TRA).3 The TRA seeks to explain why a person’s attitude towards a 
behavior frequently contrasts with his actual behavior, positing that attitude is one 
of two key variables that determine a person’s behavioral intention—which in turn 
is the best indicator of actual behavior. The other variable identified in TRA as 
contributing to behavioral intention is what Fishbein and Ajzen called subjective 
norms. Subjective norms (now known as perceived norms in the latest version of 
their theory) are the perceived social pressures that shape behavioral intention. 
In 1991, Ajzen refined the TRA by introducing a third variable, perceived 
behavioral control, to address situations where individuals lack volitional control 
over the behavior in question.4 This new model is the theory of planned behavior 
(TPB). In 2010, the TPB was further refined; while the core elements remain the 
same,5 a new framework, the reasoned-action approach (RAA), is offered. Unlike 
human-behavior theories that are applied specifically to a particular behavior—
                                            3 Wendy Hardeman et al., “Application of the Theory of Planned Behaviour in Behaviour 
Change Interventions: A Systematic Review,” Psychology & Health 17, no. 2 (2002): 124, 
doi:10.1080/08870440290013644. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen, Predicting and Changing Behavior: The Reasoned Action 
Approach (New York: Psychology Press, 2010), 20–23. 
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such as the protection-motivation theory6—the reasoned-action approach is a 
unifying framework that applies to all social behavior.7  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research asks how influence operations aimed at building legitimacy 
can be improved. The recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that 
the predominant method of conducting influence operations to improve legitimacy 
is not effective. By applying the reasoned-action approach to analysis of past 
influence campaigns, what insights may we gain to serve military influence 
operations?  
C. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
This thesis demonstrates how to improve the way the military conducts 
one of the most common types of influence operations—building legitimacy—by 
analyzing past influence operations through the reasoned-action approach 
(RAA). This framework is well regarded in social psychology; countless studies 
have shown its ability to accurately predict and understand human social 
behavior.8 Many versions of the RAA have been devised and extensively 
referenced. Using the RAA, this thesis shows conceptually how influence 
operations focused on legitimacy may be improved; as RAA efficacy is well 
established, it is not tested here.  
D. POLITICAL LEGITIMACY DEFINED 
Legitimacy building is important to the United States in cases where it 
wishes to establish or maintain political stability within a country. For the 
purposes of this thesis, legitimacy is defined as the “people’s recognition and 
                                            6 Kenzie A. Cameron, “A Practitioner’s Guide to Persuasion: An Overview of 15 Selected 
Persuasion Theories, Models and Frameworks,” Patient Education and Counseling 74, no. 3 
(March 2009): 310, doi:10.1016/j.pec.2008.12.003. 
7 Fishbein and Ajzen, Predicting and Changing Behavior: The Reasoned Action Approach, 2. 
8 Hardeman et al., “Application of the Theory of Planned Behaviour in Behaviour Change 
Interventions: A Systematic Review.” 
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acceptance of the validity of the rules of their entire political system and the 
decisions of their rulers.”9 This suggests that governments with high legitimacy 
are more stable, while governments with low legitimacy must rely on coercion to 
implement their policies. People inherently tend to be disobedient of government 
authority when legitimacy is low and will only be swayed through force.10 H.L. 
Nieburg expands upon this definition: 
Legitimacy cannot be claimed or granted by mere technicality of 
law; it must be won by the success of state institutions in cultivating 
and meeting expectations, in mediating interests and in aiding the 
process by which the values of individuals and groups are allocated 
in the making, enforcement, adjudication, and general observance 
of law.11 
From these definitions, this thesis makes the assumption that legitimacy is 
not just the product of an attitude or a frame of mind about a political system or 
its leader—it stems from a set of behaviors that indicate support or opposition to 
a political system. It is different from political support—one may not support a 
leader politically, yet find the government legitimate.  
E. THE REASONED-ACTION APPROACH 
The reasoned-action approach (RAA) adopts principles found in social 
psychology to provide a framework for understanding, and therefore predicting, 
the behavior of target audiences. By understanding how behavior is formed, 
researchers can develop effective interventions to change it. The RAA is very 
closely related to the theories of reasoned action and planned behavior originally 
developed by Fishbein and Ajzen.12 Figure 1 shows the RAA model. 
                                            9 Kenneth F. Warren, ed., Encyclopedia of U.S. Campaigns, Elections, and Electoral 
Behavior (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2008), 2:520. 
10 John Fraser, “Validating a Measure of National Political Legitimacy,” American Journal of 
Political Science 18, no. 1 (February 1, 1974): 119, doi:10.2307/2110657. 
11 H. L. Nieburg, Political Violence (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1969), 54. 




Figure 1.  The Reasoned-Action-Approach Model13 
The reasoned-action approach asserts that behavioral intention, which is 
the best indicator of actual behavior, comprises three variables: attitude toward 
the behavior; perceived norm, or the perceived social pressure to perform or not 
perform the behavior; and perceived behavioral control.14 Generally speaking, 
the more positive the attitude and perceived norm toward the behavior, and the 
stronger the perceived behavioral control, the stronger the behavioral intent to 
perform the desired behavior. Depending on the target audience and the 
behavior, the weights of these variables will differ.15 Note that only in cases 
where people actually have control over the behavior in question is behavioral 
intention a good predictor of actual behavior. 
In deciding whether to perform a behavior, an individual spontaneously 
generates these three variables, based on “readily accessible” or salient beliefs, 
to form behavioral intent.16 Fishbein and Ajzen suggest that people hold many 
beliefs, but only a small number of them (salient beliefs) are accessed in forming 
                                            13 Ibid., 22. 
14 Ibid., 20–21. 
15 Ibid., 21. 
16 Ibid., 321. 
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the determinants of behavioral intention. Figure 1 shows the three categories of 
beliefs that are associated with each of the three variables. Attitude toward a 
behavior is formed when the strength of behavioral beliefs associated with the 
behavior are weighted by the evaluation of the perceived “outcome or 
attribute.”17 A perceived norm is formed when the strength of normative beliefs 
are weighted by the “motivation to comply with the referent in question.”18 Finally, 
perceived-behavior control is formed when the strength of control beliefs are 
weighted by the “perceived power of the control factor.”19 The goal of behavioral 
interventions is either to influence those underlying salient beliefs most strongly 
associated with the behavior of interest or to introduce new salient beliefs. This 
framework does not attempt to change attitudes, norms, and controls, since, as 
spontaneous values generated by salient beliefs, they cannot be directly 
changed. Salient beliefs are influenced, but not necessarily linked to, the 
background factors associated with a given individual.  
F. HYPOTHESES 
This research examines the following hypotheses under the reasoned-
action approach: 
H1: Messages that primarily focus on promoting the sponsor are likely to 
succeed in building legitimacy for the sponsor. 
H2: Messages that primarily focus on undermining a competing adversary 
are more likely to succeed in building legitimacy for the sponsor.  
The first hypothesis speaks to the United States military’s recent attempts 
at building legitimacy through influence operations. These efforts often use 
themes that promote “good news” stories as a means to convince people that the 
government is effective. The second hypothesis is also based on recent influence 
                                            17 Icek Ajzen, “Theory of Planned Behavior Diagram,” Icek Ajzen: Homepage, accessed April 




operations and suggests legitimacy can be built for the sponsor if all the 
alternatives are delegitimized.  
G. METHODOLOGY 
Over a thousand empirical studies in professional journals use a version of 
the reasoned-action approach.20 Its efficacy and validity have been tested in 
numerous cases,21 and studies have shown that it is a reliable predictor of 
intentions and behavior over time.22 Hence, this thesis assumes the efficacy of 
the reasoned-action approach and examines several case studies through the 
lens of the RAA to understand why some influence campaigns succeed and 
others fail. If the RAA offers satisfactory explanations, we conclude it can be 
successfully applied in designing military influence operations. 
This thesis presents three case studies where organizations or 
governments attempted to build legitimacy by influencing a populace at the 
national or operational level.  
The first study examines Communist Poland, where the government 
focused on building legitimacy through decades of pro-regime propaganda, with 
little success.23 The government controlled virtually all means of communication 
and operated a robust propaganda campaign, yet had continual issues with 
legitimacy. Legitimacy improved, however, when the people believed a Soviet 
invasion was credible and imminent. This case was selected because the 
                                            20 Fishbein and Ajzen, Predicting and Changing Behavior: The Reasoned Action Approach, 
xvii. 
21 Christopher J. Armitage and Mark Conner, “Efficacy of the Theory of Planned Behaviour: A 
Meta-Analytic Review,” British Journal of Social Psychology 40, no. 4 (December 2001): 471–99, 
doi:10.1348/014466601164939. 
22 Christopher J. Armitage and Mark Conner, “The Theory of Planned Behaviour: 
Assessment of Predictive Validity and ’Perceived Control,” British Journal of Social Psychology 
38, no. 1 (March 1, 1999): 35–54, doi:10.1348/014466699164022. 
23 Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, “Communist Regimes’ Psychological Warfare Against Their 
Societies: The Case of Poland,” in Psychological Operations and Political Warfare in Long-Term 
Strategic Planning, ed. Janos Radvanyi (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 95. 
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government seeking legitimacy had total control of mass communications and 
was backed by an external foreign sponsor. 
In Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) failed to 
recognize ethnic and tribal dynamics and focused on showcasing the 
effectiveness of Afghan security forces and good governance, when in reality 
these were ineffective. Coalition forces also attempted to build legitimacy for the 
Afghan government by undermining the Taliban, which had mixed results. This 
case was selected because the government that was seeking legitimacy was 
faced with a growing insurgency that was gaining legitimacy with the population.  
The last case study examines Hezbollah, which successfully used 
influence operations to build legitimacy with Shiites by scapegoating Israel and 
offering social and civil services the Lebanese government was not providing. 
Hezbollah’s struggle to gain legitimacy among non-Shiites in Lebanon is also 
examined. This case was selected because it involves a non-state actor that was 
able to usurp the government’s authority and gain legitimacy with large portions 
of the population.  
H. OUTLINE 
Chapter II contains a literature review and highlights problems in 
contemporary influence operations. It reviews the military’s current approach to 
target audience analysis and discuss how the model used for target audience 
behavior is too simple to describe the complex dynamics of social behavior. The 
RAA and Fishbein and Ajzen’s approach to a behavioral-intervention program 
are presented in more detail.  
Chapters III, IV, and V explore the cases of Poland, Afghanistan, and 
Hezbollah, respectively, for applicable insights. Chapter VI summarizes findings 
and recommends a way forward. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review is divided into three broad sections. The first defines 
commonly used terms in military influence operations and the reasoned-action 
approach. The second reviews problems commonly identified in influence 
operations. Finally, the third section surveys the reasoned-action approach as 
used in designing behavioral-intervention programs. 
A. INFLUENCE TERMINOLOGY 
1. Influence Operations 
There is no doctrinally accepted definition for influence operations, 
although U.S. Army Field Manual 3-13, Inform and Influence Activities indicates 
influence activities “typically focus on persuading selected foreign audiences to 
support U.S. objectives or to persuade those audiences to stop supporting the 
adversary or enemy.”24 
For this thesis, influence operations are defined as the deliberate and 
synchronized execution of specific actions or activities to influence behaviors of a 
target audience in support of specific military or national objectives. Unlike 
PSYOP/MISO, influence operations encompass all activities that can be 
employed to influence a target audience.  
2. Military Information Support Operations 
Within the U.S. Department of Defense, the term psychological operations 
(PSYOP) has been replaced by military information support operations (MISO), 
but their definitions remain essentially the same and they are used 
interchangeably in this thesis. Unlike influence operations, MISO focus strictly on 
conveying selected information and indicators to the target audience. Joint 
Publication 3-13, Information Operations, defines MISO as the following: 
                                            24 U.S. Army, FM 3-13: Inform and Influence Activities (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 2013), 1–2, http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/fm3_13.pdf. 
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MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and 
indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, 
objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign 
governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. MISO focuses 
on the cognitive dimension of the information environment where its 
TA includes not just potential and actual adversaries, but also 
friendly and neutral populations.25 
3. Information Operations 
Information operations (IO), as defined by joint doctrine, is the “integrated 
employment, during military operations, of information related capabilities (IRCs) 
in concert with other lines of operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the 
decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our 
own capabilities.”26 IO is similar to influence operations in that it uses various 
capabilities to influence a target audience. However, the definition of IO is 
broader and focuses not just on influencing, but also on disrupting, corrupting, or 
usurping the target audience. While not the focus here, it is important to 
distinguish IO from influence operations. 
4. Primary Beliefs 
According to Fishbein and Ajzen, primary beliefs are those salient beliefs 
that “provide the foundation for the behavior of interest.”27 An influence campaign 
may be successful in altering some beliefs of a target audience, but if those 
beliefs are not primary, it is unlikely that behavioral change will follow. Primary 
beliefs emerge from subordinate behavioral, normative, and control beliefs and 
frequently change depending on the situation. 
                                            25 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-13: Information Operations (Washington, DC: Department 
of Defense, 2012), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Fishbein and Ajzen, Predicting and Changing Behavior: The Reasoned Action Approach, 
337. 
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B. ISSUES IN THE CURRENT APPROACH TO MILITARY INFLUENCE 
OPERATIONS 
An important task in any influence operation is choosing a desired 
behavior that can be measured or observed. Failure to do so is a common pitfall 
in behavioral-intervention programs, according to Fishbein and Ajzen. Although 
not essential for a successful campaign, measurements of behavior are useful in 
assessing influence campaigns and validating target audience analysis. 
Adjusting the design of influence operations is difficult without an effective way to 
assess progress. 
Another problem commonly cited in the literature is that of properly 
identifying the motivations of a target audience. In the U.S. military, the method 
currently used to conduct target audience analysis is ineffective and offers only a 
simplistic approach to understanding human behavior. 
Finally, as mentioned earlier, the military often fails to conduct effective 
influence operations because it understands behavioral change mostly in terms 
of attitudes. Many influence operations are designed to alter the target 
audience’s attitude as the end goal, rather than as a means toward behavioral 
change, the real goal.   
1. Measuring Behavior 
According to Fishbein and Ajzen, a key component in understanding 
behavior is accurate measurement and observation of the behavior of interest. 
Quantitative data is commonly missing in contemporary influence operations, and 
MISO/PSYOP must rely heavily on anecdotal evidence to measure behavior and 
effectiveness.28 The problem for planners is to understand and predict the 
behavior of a target audience when they cannot accurately measure whether, 
when, and if a behavior is performed. Although the need for quantitative data is 
obvious, measuring behavior is very difficult.  
                                            28 David H. Sammons, PSYOP and the Problem of Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) for the 
Combatant Commander, May 18, 2004, 14–15, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA425993. 
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Influence planners typically rely on three sources to measure behavior, 
starting with raw data. If an influence planner wants to find out whether people 
are calling a rewards hotline, for example, an analysis of call logs will determine 
the answer. Raw data such as this is extremely valuable, but often unavailable, 
for a variety of reasons.   
The second data source available to planners is intelligence and 
atmospherics. While using intelligence to determine how frequently a behavior is 
performed is highly anecdotal,29 it is typically the closest military planners have to 
direct observation, the “gold standard of behavioral assessment.”30 
Unfortunately, ever-changing collection requirements and the limited availability 
of collection assets make this type of measurement unreliable. 
The third source of measurement is public-opinion polls, which assess the 
attitudes of a target audience.31 The military uses polls with the assumption that 
attitude is the most important determinant of behavior—a highly flawed 
supposition that has been proved false. 
The difficulty of determining whether a behavior is being performed makes 
it hard for influence planners to validate their key assumptions about the target 
audience and assess the effectiveness of a campaign. This lack of validation and 
assessment typically causes influence operations to run longer than scheduled.  
2. Target Audience Analysis 
A good target audience analysis is essential in any effective campaign,32 
but the framework offered by military doctrine oversimplifies this task and makes 
                                            29 Ibid., 7–15. 
30 Fishbein and Ajzen, Predicting and Changing Behavior: The Reasoned Action Approach, 
31. 
31 Arturo Munoz, U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan: Effectiveness of 
Psychological Operations 2001-2010 (RAND Corporation, May 2012), 19–29, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1060.pdf. 
32 U.S. Army, FM 3-05.301: Psychological Operations Process, Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2007), 2–1, 
https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_c/pdf/fm3_05x301.pdf. 
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meaningful analysis difficult. The military employs cause-and-effect analysis—
commonly used in marketing—to understand human behavior. This model 
requires planners to identify a current behavior, determine what causes it, and 
predict its consequences.33 This model naively assumes that discerning 
motivation is not difficult, and its continuing use is cited as problematic, indicating 
unwarranted confidence in marketing and advertising principles that poorly fit a 
military context.34 For example, in business, market research may show a 
customer’s need for something to address a certain problem. That “something” is 
assumed to be a product to be sold to the customer. This assumption does not 
translate to the battlefield, as Mackay et al. observed in Afghanistan: 
Just because Afghans say they lack food and shelter does not 
mean that they will be persuaded by arguments promising better 
food and shelter. This is an egregious assumption, and would be to 
the detriment of your message campaign from the outset.35  
3. An Attitude-Based Approach to Influence 
According to Mackay et al., a focus on attitudinal communications is the 
reason the United States and allies fail to conduct effective influence. This is not 
to say that attitude is unimportant; but attitudinal communications aim at 
changing people’s attitudes as a goal or end state, rather than focusing on 
changing their behavior.36 While Mackay et al. observe that this type of 
communication works in business, where the target audience is compliant,37 
there is little evidence that attitudinal communications work where the audience 
is noncompliant. With compliant audiences, the desired behavior is, for the most 
                                            33 Ibid., 2–11. 
34 Andrew Mackay, Steve Tatham, and Lee Rowland, The Effectiveness of US Military 
Information Operations in Afghanistan 2001-2010: Why RAND Missed the Point (Defence 
Academy of the United Kingdom, December 2012), i, 
http://www.da.mod.uk/publications/library/central-asian-
series/20121214_Whyrandmissedthepoint_U_1202a.pdf. 
35 Andrew Mackay and Steve Tatham, Behavioural Conflict: Why Understanding People and 
Their Motivations Will Prove Decisive in Future Conflict (Essex, United Kingdom: Military Studies 
Press, 2011), 168. 
36 Mackay, Tatham, and Rowland, Why RAND Missed the Point, 3. 
37 Ibid., 5. 
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part, congruent with beliefs already held. In their 2012 report on the effectiveness 
of MISO/PSYOP, Mackay et al. give an example of how compliant audiences 
respond to attitudinal communications:  
One brand of toothpaste, for example, is not significantly different 
[from] another, but if you associate with it, through an attitudinal 
marketing campaign, certain “desirable” qualities or characteristics 
(for example, extra whitening capability, pleasant breath qualities, 
etc.) you effectively differentiate it from your competitors in the eyes 
of the consumer who is now more likely to purchase your brand. As 
a consumer walking into a supermarket you will be confronted by 
an array of different toothpastes and your decision to purchase may 
well be swayed by an [advertisement] you have seen for a 
particular brand. The key to this, however, is that you have already 
made the decision to purchase; your behaviour [sic] has been 
predetermined by your upbringing (always clean your teeth before 
bed), your education (not cleaning your teeth will cause you painful 
medical problems) and other social factors (guys with bad breath 
don’t get girls!) for example.38 
In this example, the decision to behave in a certain way (i.e., to purchase 
toothpaste) has already been made—the consumer just needs to be steered or 
“nudged” toward a particular brand. By contrast, in military influence operations, 
the target audience is often noncompliant, in the sense that the behavior the 
military wants them to perform is not consistent with the beliefs they hold. 
C. THE REASONED-ACTION APPROACH TO BEHAVIORAL 
INTERVENTIONS 
The reasoned-action approach is a contemporary theoretical framework 
for understanding behavior and prediction, built on the earlier theories of 
reasoned action (TRA) and planned behavior (TPB), which have generated over 
a thousand empirical studies published in professional journals across 
disciplines.39 Fishbein and Ajzen argue that although human social behavior is 
complex, a set of variables can be applied to all types of behavior such that it can 
                                            38 Ibid., 4. 
39 Fishbein and Ajzen, Predicting and Changing Behavior: The Reasoned Action Approach, 
xvii. 
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be understood and predicted. This allows the development of effective 
behavioral-intervention programs. Fishbein and Ajzen do not assert these 
variables as exclusively valuable in understanding a particular behavior, but offer 
the RAA as a unifying conceptual framework that can incorporate other variables 
as warranted.40  
1. Identifying the Behavior of Interest and Target Audience 
The first step in the RAA is to determine which behavior of interest a 
researcher wants to understand. This may seem straightforward, but the 
definition of a behavior dictates how it is observed and measured and must be 
carefully made, according to inherent tradeoffs. To make a behavior easier to 
observe, we can narrow the definition to something quite specific; however, the 
more specific the behavior, the less informative the data. For example, 
measuring how frequently people used the treadmill at the Naval Postgraduate 
School gym on Mother’s Day at 8 a.m. is easier to collect than figuring out how 
frequently Monterey residents exercised in the past two weeks. It is virtually 
impossible to observe the latter directly without following and observing the target 
audience 24 hours a day. Nevertheless, the generality of the behavior gives it 
better utility. Fishbein and Ajzen suggest self-reporting as a way around this 
problem—a technique the military has not embraced when it comes to influence 
operations. There are risks associated with self-reporting, and for obvious 
reasons it is applicable for only certain behaviors.41   
Fishbein and Ajzen recommend that behavioral interventions should be 
conducted with the assumption that a substantial segment of the target audience 
is not performing the desired behavior. If this is true, it is likely the target 
audience is too broad and must be further refined since a significant portion of 
the target audience is already performing the desired behavior.42 
                                            40 Ibid., 2. 
41 Ibid., 37–38. 
42 Ibid., 325. 
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There are two reasons a substantial segment of the target audience may 
not be performing a desired behavior—either they have no intention of doing so 
or they intend to, but fail to execute.43 This is important because the method 
used to influence someone depends on whether he already intends to perform 
the behavior. Persons who have no behavioral intent are “in a deliberative mind-
set in which they seek information about the feasibility and desirability of the 
contemplated behavior.”44  Persons who already intend to perform the behavior 
are in an “implemental mind-set where they focus on information relevant to the 
implementation of the intention, that is, on where, when, and how to act on the 
intention.”45  
2. Formative Research 
A critical step in developing an intervention strategy is formative 
research.46 Unless interventions are carefully and deliberately designed and 
evaluated, precious resources may be squandered or the result may be worse 
than no intervention at all. Formative research should begin with an elicitation of 
beliefs from a pilot sample that is representative of the overall target audience. 
Additionally, self-reports of past behavior and demographic information should 
also be collected, since past behavior links to future behavior and demographic 
information helps verify representativeness. A sample size of 30 people is 
sufficient for a highly homogeneous population, while a heterogeneous group 
requires a larger pilot sample—usually 15–20 people per major subgroup.47 
A representative target audience has both qualitative and quantitative 
elements. Qualitative elements are used to identify the salient beliefs (behavioral, 
normative, and control) associated with a desired behavior. Fishbein and Ajzen 
recommend asking participants the following: 
                                            43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 326–327. 
47 Ibid. 
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 List what they believe to be the advantages and disadvantages of 
performing the behavior of interest.48 
 Indicate who would approve and disapprove of their performing the 
behavior, as well as their beliefs as to who does and does not 
perform it.49 
 List the factors that would make it easier or more difficult for them 
to perform the behavior.50 
On the quantitative side, the sample should be able to show the 
prevalence of the desired behavior within the target audience and should 
determine “whether people intend to perform the behavior and how much control 
they perceive they have over performing the behavior.”51 
3. Beliefs 
A key assumption of this model is that behavior “follows reasonably and 
often spontaneously from the information or beliefs people possess about the 
behavior under consideration.”52 Fishbein and Ajzen identify three kinds of 
beliefs: behavioral, normative, and control.53 For behavior to change, suggest the 
authors, corresponding behavioral, normative, and control beliefs called primary 
beliefs must be changed.54 Regardless of how beliefs related to a specific 
behavior are formed, they influence the decision as to whether a behavior is 
performed.  
Those beliefs linked to positive or negative consequences associated with 
performing a behavior are called behavioral beliefs. These beliefs are assumed 
to determine the “attitude toward personally performing the behavior.” If a person 
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perceives a certain behavior to have more positive than negative consequences, 
it is likely his attitude toward the behavior is also positive.55   
Normative beliefs refer to perceived behavioral expectations a person 
experiences from individuals or groups. It also encompasses whether the 
behavior of interest is actually performed by those important to him. These 
beliefs form what is called a perceived norm—the perceived social pressure an 
individual experiences as to whether to perform the behavior. If the person sees 
that most of his or her significant others approve of the behavior, and indeed, 
perform it, the person is likely to experience social pressure to perform it as 
well.56  
 Beliefs that are formed about personal and environmental factors 
associated with the behavior of interest are called control beliefs. These have to 
do with factors the person sees as facilitating or impeding the execution of the 
behavior. When these beliefs are aggregated, a perceived self-efficacy or 
perceived behavioral control emerges. Perceived behavioral control is 
considered high when more control beliefs are associated with facilitating than 
inhibiting factors.57 
Fishbein and Ajzen argue the examination of beliefs offers “insights into 
the way people think about behavior.” At this level, researchers can really 
understand how things influence decisions about a given behavior. Identifying the 
relevant behavioral, normative, and control beliefs are key to designing a 
behavior-change intervention. 
4. Behavioral Intention 
After attitudes, perceived norms, and perceived behavioral control have 
been formed from underlying beliefs, they are directly available to influence 
intentions and behavior. The combination of these variables forms behavioral 
                                            55 Ibid., 20. 
56 Ibid., 20–21. 
57 Ibid., 21. 
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intention, a person’s readiness to perform the behavior in question. The weight of 
each variable will differ depending on the behavior and the target audience,58 
which explains why groups with comparable attitudes, perceived norms, and 
perceived behavioral controls may behave differently. 
Behavioral intention is the best indicator and predictor of actual behavior. 
However, this is true only when people have real control over the behavior in 
question, not just perceived control. Because the measurement of actual 
behavioral control is not possible for most behaviors, perceived behavioral 
control can be used as a substitute. The more accurately perceived behavioral 
control reflects reality, the more likely intention will predict behavior.59  
D. SUMMARY 
The literature review in this chapter defines terms, introduces major 
problems in the current approach to influence operations, and notes that reliance 
on marketing principles has been unproductive in Iraq and Afghanistan. This 
review suggests that an attitudinal approach to influence should not be the goal 
of influence operations; rather, objectives should be behavioral. The reasoned-
action approach to behavioral intervention is discussed, several 
recommendations by Fishbein and Ajzen concerning developing programs are 
relayed, with potential shortfalls identified, and the reasoned-action approach is 
justified as a superior model over cause-and-effect in understanding human 
behavior. 
                                            58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., 20–22. 
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III. COMMUNIST POLAND 
A. BACKGROUND 
World War II marked a time of significant change in Polish society. Millions 
of Poles died and many more were forced to relocate by the time the war ended 
in 1945. In 1939, both Germany and Russia invaded and partitioned Poland. 
Furthermore, during what is now known as the Katyn Massacre, the Soviets 
killed close to 22,000 Polish nationals captured during its invasion.60 
Historically, Polish politics had included a communist party, but by 1939, 
the Communist Party of Poland (KPP) had been dissolved.61 Most Poles saw it 
as an agent of the Soviet Union and marginalized the party in a country with 
deep anti-Russian attitudes.62 Unfortunately for Polish communists, Joseph 
Stalin was also distrustful of the KPP and viewed its members as agents of the 
Polish regime, arresting or killing most during the Great Purge (1934-40).63 
Germany’s 1941 invasion of Russia, however, necessitated a Russo-Polish 
alliance in response. To Stalin, this meant reviving the communist party in 
Poland.64    
Stalin suggested that for communism to thrive, it should become palatable 
by embracing a more Polish identity.65 Thus the new communist party would not 
emphasize links with the Soviet Union, but rather focus on nationalistic themes to 
gain legitimacy. The Polish Workers’ Party (PPR) was accordingly created in 
                                            60 Benjamin B. Fischer, The Katyn Controversy: Stalin’s Killing Field (Center for the Study of 
Intelligence, Winter 1999), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-
publications/csi-studies/studies/winter99-00/art6.html. 
61 Jan C. Behrends, “Nation and Empire: Dilemmas of Legitimacy during Stalinism in Poland 
(1941–1956),” Nationalities Papers 37, no. 4 (2009): 445–446, doi:10.1080/00905990902985686. 
62 Ibid., 445. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., 445–446. 
65 Ibid., 446. 
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1942, by Polish communist exiles who had survived the Great Purge and were 
living in Russia.66    
Indigenous nationalist groups were deemed a threat to the PPR and the 
Soviet Union. The Polish Home Army, a resistance movement that reported to 
the anti-communist government-in-exile, was initially tolerated, and the Soviets 
accepted their assistance in fighting the Germans.67 However, as soon as 
practical, the Soviets arrested Home Army commanders they saw as “counter-
revolutionaries.”68 The true Soviet attitude towards nationalistic movements was 
displayed in the Warsaw Uprising on August 1, 1944, when the Soviet Army was 
ordered to stop their advance in Poland just short of Warsaw and watch the 
Home Army get destroyed by the Germans. Despite their heroic efforts, the 
Home Army, which was the largest resistance movement in Poland, was crushed 
after 63 days.69 This set the stage for the communist takeover of Poland, as 
liberated areas once controlled by the Nazis were transferred to the Soviet Army 
and then to Polish communists.70 With the disbanding of the Home Army, the 
communists emerged as the most powerful political force in Poland, and by 1946, 
the PPR was firmly in power, with assistance from the Soviet Union.71 
B. BUILDING LEGITIMACY 
1. Soviet Friendship 
Due to a variety of social, historical, and cultural beliefs, the Poles were 
very resistant to communism and its values. Its establishment was seen as a 
result of the Soviet occupation rather than an indigenous movement with popular 
                                            66 Ibid. 
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support.72 Polish communists found themselves operating in a hostile 
environment whose population saw them as puppets of the Soviet Union. The 
leaders knew from the onset that communism would be a hard sell, and influence 
operations began in the early 1940s.73 The difficulty was to prevent the people 
from linking Polish communism with the Soviet Union—a country perceived as an 
enemy responsible for destroying Polish sovereignty.74 Alfred Lampe, a surviving 
member of the original KPP recognized the difficulties: 
With the exception of the communists all traditional political parties 
in Poland are anti-soviet [sic]. . . . An orientation towards the USSR, 
in the way we have seen in Czechoslovakia, never existed and 
does not exist in Poland in any party. And it cannot exist because 
the historical development of Poland and Czechoslovakia was 
different and the political traditions differ from one country to the 
other.75 
The Polish communists’ first well known propaganda campaign during the 
German occupation, entitled “What are We Fighting For?,” pushed nationalistic 
themes and the need to ally with the Soviet Union.76 The PPR portrayed itself as 
the “sole representative of a genuine struggle for national liberation,” claiming 
other groups such as the nationalists were actually working with the Nazis.77 To 
the average Pole, this message was absurd, because they were contrary to 
those beliefs already held about the resistance movement. The Polish Home 
Army, which had no links to the communist party, was by far the largest and most 
popular resistance movement and shouldered the majority of the fighting.78 The 
Peoples’ Army was the communist underground movement, but its size was 
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approximately a tenth of the Home Army’s and a significant percentage was 
actually Soviet citizens.79 To suggest that the communists were somehow 
leading the fight against the Germans did not align with majority beliefs. Popular 
skepticism, combined with general negativity toward communism and Russia, 
made the communists look foolish. As interpreted through the reasoned-action 
approach, the communists were attempting to change attitudes by introducing a 
new belief—that the communists were leading the resistance. However, this new 
belief conflicted with the knowledge people already held, so attitudinal change 
did not occur. The Polish communists’ first attempt at influence operations was 
unsuccessful by all metrics and probably hurt their credibility more than anything. 
Subsequent propaganda efforts continued along nationalistic lines with little 
success.80   
The next significant influence operation by the communists began when 
the Soviet Army reentered Poland to “liberate” it from Nazi Germany in the 
summer of 1944.81 With the Soviet Army came the Polish Committee of National 
Liberation (PKWN), a Soviet-backed provisional government that opposed the 
Polish government-in-exile and claimed legitimate rule. The PKWN’s first order of 
business was to disseminate a manifesto in an effort to gain legitimacy and 
credibility.82 Although the manifesto was just one propaganda product, it 
presented the general lines of persuasion the PKWN would use in influence 
operations, as well as a vision for the future and several issues assumed to 
resonate with Poles. 
The July Manifesto again used nationalism as a theme, but this time the 
propaganda was more sensitive to commonly held beliefs.83 The PKWN decided 
to selectively align with the nationalism associated with Roman Dmowski, a 
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popular ideologue whose views had wide appeal. The communists believed 
identifying with some of Dmowski’s views would build legitimacy for the PKWN.84  
Following Dmowski, the PKWN urged the uniting of Slavs from Poland, 
Russia, and Czechoslovakia, to form “a great Slavic dam” to oppose German 
imperialism.85 Dmowski was not particularly fond of Russia, but perceived 
Germany as the bigger threat. He had previously proposed a Russo–Polish 
alliance against Germany and the communists decided to reintroduce this idea. 
The July Manifesto recognized the bloody history between Poland and Russia, 
but suggested a new alliance similar to that which followed the Battle of 
Grunwald in 1410—a Slavic alliance to defeat Germany. The PKWN knew anti-
Russian sentiment was a problem and used pan-Slavism to overcome distrust, 
promoting shared ethnic and cultural identification against a common enemy 
(Germany). However, though pan-Slavism was supported by Dmowski, it was 
“traditionally seen as a pretext for Russian domination” in Poland.86 The fact that 
most Poles viewed PKWN and communism as a creation of Russia did not help 
the communist case. 
The manifesto stated that national borders would be redrawn to benefit 
Poland87 and made promises that resonated with the people, such as land 
reform, democratic freedoms, minimum wages, universal education, and 
immigration reform. Regardless of whether the PKWN would follow up, they did 
address many concerns the people had about the future of Poland, in an effort to 
change attitudes by moderating popular beliefs about communism.  
The 1946 referendum in Poland essentially consolidated power for the 
communists.88 Up to this point, they had relied on a form of nationalism to build 
legitimacy, with very little success. Beginning in 1947, the Soviet Union 
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abandoned this strategy and instead forced Eastern Bloc nations to support and 
promote a “utopian vision of the Soviet Union.”89 This meant building legitimacy 
by promoting and idealizing the Soviet Union and its form of communism. In a 
country with deep anti-Russian sentiment, this strategy ended in failure. 
As mentioned, most Poles viewed the communist government as a 
creation of the Soviet Union and communism as a system that was forced on 
them by a hostile foreign power.90 To counter this narrative, the communist 
government began a systematic campaign to portray the Soviet Union as a friend 
and ally whose relationship was critical for the survival of the nation. Virtually 
every Pole was heavily exposed to pro-Soviet or Soviet-friendship propaganda at 
all stages of life. Children learned poems that praised the greatness of the Soviet 
Union. Propaganda extolled the benefits of Soviet friendship. Censorship and 
propaganda operated at all levels of education, mass media, arts, and literature, 
and in social groups such as youth organizations and trade unions.91 The Society 
for Polish–Soviet Friendship (TPPR) was created to help spread the word, 
staging grand displays of public support for the Soviet Union.92 Years of 
propaganda saturated the various media with stories praising Russia. “Socialist 
content” was injected in all aspects of cultural life, and authoritarian controls over 
artistic and cultural organizations prevented any criticism of government policies 
or the Soviet Union.93 Yet all this did nothing to change the majority attitude of 
the Poles, who were suffering greatly under the regime.94  
Also despite their efforts, the Polish communists could not change the 
perception that they were stooges of the Soviet Union. The Polish Workers’ 
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Party’s initialization, “PPR,” was commonly mocked as the Platne Pacholki Rosji 
or “Paid Servants of Russia.”95 The actions of the Soviet Union did not help; for 
example, the Soviet Army’s mistreatment of Polish civilians repatriating at the 
end of World War II angered Poles, and the People’s Commissariat for Internal 
Affairs (NKVD), the secret police of the Soviet Union, routinely terrorized 
communities. In addition, the Soviet Union was perceived as economically 
exploiting Poland. These activities directly countered the propaganda messages, 
and legitimacy was so low that the party had to falsify electoral results and rig the 
1946 referendum that consolidated its power. In an April 1945 meeting, an 
influential member of the PPR central committee acknowledged that “our 
propaganda is weak” and not trustworthy.96 Władysław Gomułka, the leader of 
the PPR, also cited the lack of credibility and the difficulty they faced in 
separating themselves from the Soviets: 
Many see in Russia just a continuation of the old Russia—and the 
legacy of this old Russia is war and centuries of oppression. This 
undermines the soul of the nation. The reconfigurations of such 
attitudes will take a long time. . . . that Russia had stolen from 
Poland a considerable piece of land. This fact has far-reaching 
consequences for us. . . . the masses should see us as a Polish 
party, they should attack us as Polish communists and not as an 
agency [of the USSR].97 
The Polish government’s non-coercive means to influence the population 
was ineffective. This necessitated the government, like many Eastern Bloc 
nations, to use coercive means to maintain power and control. Poland’s secret 
police regularly strong-armed groups and individuals to support the government 
and repressed those who did not.98   
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2. Propaganda of Success 
From the 1970s to the early 1980s, the communist government began to 
refocus its propaganda to tout economic reforms aimed at improving the lives of 
ordinary Poles.99 This effort, called the “propaganda of success,” was fixed on 
highlighting and exaggerating the political and economic successes of the 
government.100 The objective was to change negative beliefs by boosting only 
positive stories about the government. An example was the dubious portrayal of 
Poland as an advanced European country enjoying significant growth due to 
government reforms.101 All levels of state-controlled media were required to 
support this campaign102 and almost all television series produced at the time 
expressed this propaganda.103 
Poland’s propaganda of success campaign backfired. Although Poland did 
experience some growth during this period, it was due to loans the government 
borrowed from the West rather than meaningful reforms.104 Ultimately, the loans 
nearly bankrupted the country and led to worse living conditions for the majority 
of the population, as the government was forced to raise prices on basic goods to 
avoid defaulting. The propaganda of success belied the grim life many were 
experiencing and symbolized what was wrong with the government. A Foreign 
Affairs article published during that time summarized the sentiment: 
After 35 years of communist rule in Poland, the Polish population, 
including the working class, ceased to believe in the Party's 
authority, its ability, and its right to rule. Nothing so clearly 
                                            99 Ray Taras, Ideology in a Socialist State : Poland, 1956-1983 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), 143. 
100 Ibid., 145. 
101 Dorota Ostrowska, “The Carnival of the Absurd: Stanisław Bareja’s Alternatywy 4 and 
Polish Television in the 1980s,” in Popular Television in Eastern Europe During and Since 
Socialism, ed. Anikó Imre, Timothy Havens, and Kati Lustyik (New York: Routledge, 2013), 75. 
102 Jane Leftwich Curry, Poland’s Journalists: Professionalism and Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 66. 
103 Ostrowska, “The Carnival of the Absurd: Stanisław Bareja’s Alternatywy 4 and Polish 
Television in the 1980s,” 75. 
104 Ibid. 
 29
demonstrated the gulf between the legal and the civil society as the 
overwhelming popular response to the visit of Pope John Paul II to 
his native country in the summer of 1979. The effects of virtual 
economic bankruptcy and the crisis of political authority were 
compounded for the population by a heightened visibility and 
awareness of official corruption and privilege. Workers harbored a 
growing sense of the injustice perpetrated by a state which claimed 
incessantly to represent the workers and stressed continuously in 
its propaganda the centrality of the workers in society.105 
This growing sense of injustice sparked a series of protests and strikes 
around the country that led to the birth of the Solidarity trade union,106 which 
eventually helped end communism in Poland.  
C. ANALYSIS 
In its various influence campaigns designed to build legitimacy, the 
government tried to elicit support by changing what Fishbein and Ajzen identify 
as behavioral beliefs. Figure 2 presents an RAA analysis of ethnic Poles who 
opposed the communist government. This model generalizes the target audience 
to make analysis possible. Based on information available, it is impossible to 
determine the exact weights of the three determinants of behavioral intention 
(attitude, perceived norm, and perceived behavioral control). However, it is clear 
that perceived behavioral control was weighted lowest in the minds of the people. 
Generally speaking, there was nothing that physically prevented the TA from 
performing a behavior; the perceived behavioral control was high. From this, we 
conclude that perceived behavioral control was the least important variable in this 
case. Based on this research, the TA’s attitude toward the behavior was overall 
negative, as was the perceived norm. This helps explain why there was so much 
unrest throughout Polish communist rule. 
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Figure 2.  RAA analysis of ethnic Poles who opposed the communist 
government 
Table 1 shows likely salient beliefs of those who did not support the 
communist government. These beliefs are not inclusive, but nevertheless 
represent the general beliefs of the target audience in the period studied. The 
table also captures the influence themes and other beliefs that may have affected 
the TA’s primary beliefs (those beliefs most important to the desired behavior). 
The Polish campaigns were a failure because the target audience held too 
many beliefs that were incongruent with the influence messages the government 
disseminated. Its campaign to change beliefs about the Soviet Union was too 
ambitious—those beliefs could not be easily altered, as many communists 
recognized.107 The propaganda of success campaign was equally disastrous, 
because the government presented a fairytale version of Poland that was not 
based on reality. The campaign likely discredited the government further and 
contributed to social unrest.108  
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Other events the TA experienced, as listed in the third column of Table 1, 
likely affected popular primary beliefs more than any propaganda campaign. As a 
general rule, Fishbein and Ajzen describe beliefs based on personal experience 
as much harder to affect than those based on a secondary source.109 The 
government’s focus on the greatness of communism and the Soviet Union 
completely contradicted what people were experiencing, and thus the influence 
campaign was probably worse than nothing. 
 
Table 1.   Primary beliefs of Poles who did not support the 
government 
The primary beliefs listed in Table 1 suggest that almost all communist 
influence messages ran counter to beliefs strongly held. Owing to social norms 
and history, the Soviet-friendship influence campaign could not overcome deep-
                                            109 Fishbein and Ajzen, Predicting and Changing Behavior: The Reasoned Action Approach, 
333. 
Primary Beliefs Influence Themes Other Influencing Events Outcome
Supporting the communist 
government means supporting 
the Soviet Union and a 
betrayal to my country.
-Polish communists are the sole 
representative of a genuine 
struggle for national liberation
-PKWN will redraw the border to 
benefit Poland
'-Soviet friendship brings prosperity 
and equal rights for all
-The Soviet Army liberated Poland 
and Soviet friendship will bring an 
end to centuries of conflict with 
Russia.
-Support a Slavic alliance with 
Russia to oppose German 
aggression
-The Soviets divided the country 
with Nazi Germany (Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact).
-Poland's eastern territories 
annexed by the USSR in 1944 
leading to forced mass migrations.
-The Home Army fought in notable 
liberation battles while the Peoples' 
Army did not.
'-Widespread Soviet Army 
mistreatment of Polish civilians as 
it "liberated" Poland. 
-Soviet involvement in the Katyn 
Massacre.
-NKVD's reign of terror in Poland.
Failed to change belief. 
Supporting the communist 
government means will make 
life worse.
-Communism brings prosperity to 
the people
-Poland is one of the most 
advanced countries in Europe
-Poor economic conditions
-Basic food prices skyrocketed 
multiple times during communist 
rule
Failed to change belief. 
I have no positive reason to 
support the communist 
government.
-Joining the Society for Polish-
Soviet Friendship or the communist 
party provides more opportunities
-People not friendly toward 
government policies harassed or 
do not have as many opportunities.
Marginally successfully in 
changing belief.
People who are important to 
me do not support the 
communist government.
N/A -Popular uprisings in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1971, 1976, 1980-81. Belief not targeted.
People who are important to 
me think that I should not 
support the communist 
government
N/A -Popular uprisings in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1971, 1976, 1980-81. Belief not targeted.
I am able to support the 
communist government if I so 
desire
N/A N/A Belief not targeted.
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seated hostility. The Polish government promoted influence campaigns that 
portrayed the Soviets in a good light. Since they could not gain legitimacy 
because of their links to the Soviets, and they could not break those links, the 
only alternative was to expand support for the Soviets, and thus the campaign 
was doomed from the start.  
The propaganda of success campaign had difficulty changing beliefs 
about the economy and country because those beliefs were usually formed 
through personal experience. A person whose life degraded under communist 
rule was unlikely to believe propaganda to the contrary.  
Interestingly, the Polish government did experience legitimacy for a very 
short period of time around the time it implemented martial law in response to the 
Solidarity movement. Its stated reason for implementing martial law was the real 
possibility of a Soviet intervention of Poland.110 Not only had Russia invaded 
Poland multiple times throughout its history, it also intervened militarily in East 
Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968 to quell popular 
uprisings.111 This made most Poles believe that a military intervention was 
plausible. The imminent threat of a Soviet invasion caused the target audience to 
recalculate its primary beliefs about supporting the government. The existing 
communist government was preferred to any government the Soviets might 
impose. In response to the possibility of an invasion, the Solidarity leadership 
described its movement as a “self-limiting revolution” and asserted that Poland 
would remain in the Warsaw Pact if they ever took power.112 It is obvious that 
they took the possibility of a Soviet intervention very seriously and likely knew an 
intervention would build legitimacy for the existing communist government. When 
the communist government finally decided to impose martial law at the end of 
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1981, there was no significant resistance from Solidarity or the majority of the 
population—surprising the Polish, Soviet, and American governments.113 Once 
the threat of an intervention was reduced, so too was the communist 
government’s legitimacy. 
The legitimacy campaign continued until the fall of the regime in 1989, 
having struggled through decades of trying. In an opinion poll in December 1988, 
only 3.6 percent of Poles expressed satisfaction with the system, 27.6 percent 
said some changes were needed, 43.1 percent indicated major changes were 
needed, and 19.1 percent completely rejected the system.114 This sentiment 
helps explain the social unrest of 1956, 1968, 1970, 1971, 1976, and 1980–1981 
and the government’s persistent illegitimacy. 
D. CONCLUSION 
An analysis of the target audience’s primary beliefs indicates that the 
Polish government’s propaganda of success and Soviet-friendship influence 
campaigns were unlikely to ever succeed. The literature suggests that Polish 
communists generally understood the motivations of their TA and recognized the 
difficulty. However, they failed to recognize the strength of these beliefs and 
believed propaganda backed by state coercion was sufficient to change them. 
Since the communists derived most of their power from the Soviet Union, they 
were forced to adopt themes that contradicted anti-Soviet views and supported 
Soviet objectives. This unavoidable focus was probably the biggest factor in their 
failure to gain legitimacy, which in turn led to unrest and eventually the end of 
communist rule. 
The case of Poland suggests that influence campaigns that use “success 
stories” should be avoided when influence messages are unbelievable to the 
target audience—that is, when they contradict primary beliefs. Disbelief is more 
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likely when a sponsor government lacks legitimacy and credibility among the 
target audience. Since legitimacy is often linked to a government’s performance 
as an institution, it is probable that a government already enjoys significant 
legitimacy where a target audience’s beliefs concur with the influence message. 
This suggests that success stories may be useful in maintaining legitimacy, but 
not in building legitimacy for the sponsor.  
The potential Soviet intervention in the early 1980s also suggests that 
legitimacy can be built for a sponsor if the alternative to the sponsor is 
unacceptable to the population. If an influence operation is able to convince the 
population that the rival will grab power, it will likely boost legitimacy for the 




The United States and its allies have been fighting in Afghanistan for over 
a decade. Millions of dollars have been invested towards developing legitimate 
governance in Afghanistan, with little progress. One of the main impediments has 
been the Taliban. After a humiliating defeat in late 2001, the Taliban reorganized 
as an insurgency. Their explosive growth in numbers since 2006 has badly 
undermined government legitimacy, particularly in rural areas dominated by 
Pashtuns—the ethnic group most strongly associated with the Taliban. Thus 
despite years of MISO/PSYOP by coalition forces, the central government of 
Afghanistan has not secured legitimacy with significant portions of Pashtuns. 
Generally speaking, Pashtuns have a high distrust of outsiders, and their 
tribal roots make them suspicious of central authority.115 The mountainous terrain 
and extreme climates in southern and eastern Afghanistan contribute to the 
isolation of many villages and tribes. Numerous attempts in the past to establish 
a strong central government have failed, as many Pashtuns view such a 
government as a threat to their tribal way of life.116   
As the largest ethnic group, Pashtuns have dominated the political 
landscape in Afghanistan; the country has been ruled almost exclusively by 
Pashtuns since its establishment as a state in 1747,117 and Pashtuns remain at 
the core of political and state development.118 Pashtun dominance has not 
necessarily translated to ethnic strife, as ordinary people have been, for the most 
part, tolerant of other ethnicities. However, when it comes to politics, ethnicity 
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has always played an important role, and in the Afghan civil war (1992–1996), 
ethnicity became a central issue as regards claims to legitimacy.119 In fact, every 
major faction involved in the civil war can be identified ethnically: Hezb-e-Islami 
and the Taliban are Pashtun, Jamiat-e-Islami is Tajik, Hezb-e-Wahdat is Hazara, 
and Jumbesh-e-Melli Islami is Uzbek.120 
With the removal of the Taliban from power by the Tajik-dominated 
Northern Alliance, with significant assistance from the United States, a new, 
ethnically inclusive central government was established. This created a 
perception among Pashtuns that the international community was assisting a 
central government that did not support Pashtun interests,121 since they no 
longer dominated the political landscape at the national level. Hamid Karzai, a 
Pashtun, has held the presidency of the government since inception, but his 
cabinet members, whose appointment requires parliamentary approval, are not 
predominantly Pashtun. Moreover, many Pashtuns saw the international effort to 
discredit the 2009 elections as a scheme to replace a Pashtun with a Tajik.122 
According to the University of Maryland’s “Minorities at Risk” project, one of the 
main grievances of Pashtuns is a perceived lack of representation in the national 
government.123 
The role of ethnicity is significant because the Taliban, the main 
insurgency against the government, has appealed to the ethnic majority by 
portraying itself as a Pashtun nationalist movement. In addition, since most 
Taliban members are Pashtun, unsurprisingly, most insurgents killed or captured 
are Pashtun. From the Pashtun point of view, non-Pashtun interlopers are trying 
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to dominate and control the country, with the help of foreign powers. As a result, 
most Pashtuns remain, at best, neutral towards the central government.124  
This case study examines legitimacy-building influence operations that 
targeted Pashtuns in Pashtun-majority areas in southern and eastern 
Afghanistan in the late 2000s. The RAA is used to help understand the 
behavioral intent of the target audience and why the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) campaign to build legitimacy in the late-2000s has failed 
in large swaths of southern and eastern Afghanistan.  
B. BUILDING LEGITIMACY 
Influence operations by the United States at the beginning of the war took 
an enemy-centered approach, focusing almost exclusively on supporting 
offensive operations.125 The United States invaded Afghanistan with the intention 
of bringing those responsible for the September 11th attacks to justice, not for 
nation building or counterinsurgency, and its influence operations reflected this 
goal. This is important to note, because many of the heavy-handed tactics 
employed during this time (such as massive bombing runs) created the 
population’s beliefs about the coalition forces and would later affect the 
coalition’s ability to influence the population.126  
ISAF faced two significant hurdles in helping the Afghan government build 
legitimacy in the late-2000s. The first was changing popular beliefs about the 
Afghan government and its primary benefactor, ISAF. The government’s close 
and dependent relationship with ISAF made it difficult to disassociate the actions 
of the coalition from the Afghan government. The second challenge was 
countering the Taliban’s attempts to delegitimize the central government and 
establish itself as the legitimate government for the Pashtuns. The Taliban 
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routinely carried out attacks knowing they would fail militarily. Nevertheless, 
these attacks were psychologically effective in creating a perception that the 
government could not provide security, as well as in demonstrating Taliban 
strength.127 ISAF responded with two broad influence campaigns: one promoted 
the effectiveness of the Afghan government and the other focused on 
delegitimizing the Taliban and other insurgency groups.  
1. Promoting the Afghan Government 
ISAF’s influence efforts in the mid-2000s focused primarily on the positive 
work of the central government and successful operations by Afghan security 
forces. This emphasis led to coalition forces’ trying to put an “Afghan face” on 
almost everything they did.128  
By the late 2000s, a common influence theme was that the Afghan 
government brought “peace and progress” to Afghanistan.129 PSYOP products 
frequently linked support of the government with new freedoms, economic 
prosperity, security, and development. The population was initially receptive to 
these messages, but they became ineffective as the war continued and these 
“promises” went unfulfilled.130 Additionally, there was a perception that many 
development projects were going to the north, where there were only pockets of 
Pashtuns.131 This perception may have had some merit, considering the north 
was relatively safe and secure compared to the south and east, where most 
Pashtuns reside. People began to get disillusioned as corruption became 
rampant and infrastructure projects were undermined by corrupt officials.  
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The other problem was the perception that the presence of the ISAF and 
Afghan government in a given area was only temporary.132 Years of combat 
operations convinced the target audience that coalition forces never stayed long. 
The TA consistently witnessed the Taliban’s returning after being cleared by 
coalition forces and learned that supporting the government was a risky 
proposition—they could be punished when the insurgents came back.133 
The influence operations of this period also boasted the ability of the 
Afghan government to provide security and defeat the Taliban. In southern and 
eastern Afghanistan, this was far from the truth; insecurity was rampant, and the 
Taliban dominated the countryside. The only area in which the government had a 
permanent presence was the major cities. As the Taliban returned, it established 
itself wherever the government lacked presence, offering dispute-resolution 
services and establishing law and order that otherwise did not exist.134 Taliban-
run courts were often perceived as more effective and fair than competing 
government systems, which were seen as corrupt.135 Rather than rely on 
propaganda that aimed at changing people’s attitudes, the Taliban frequently 
depended on tribal allegiances to maintain legitimacy among the people.136 
2. Delegitimizing the Insurgency 
ISAF’s other approach to building legitimacy for the Afghan government 
was to delegitimize its main competitor, the Taliban. This primarily meant pointing 
out the hypocrisy of their actions. As a means of establishing legitimacy with the 
people, the Taliban published its Layeha, or “codes of conduct” for its cadre, in 
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2006.137 The Layeha included rules for Taliban fighters to abide by and 
emphasized protecting civilians and catering to local sensitivities, especially in 
southern and rural Afghanistan—suggesting that the Taliban was also concerned 
about building legitimacy.138 Coalition forces used this document by frequently 
pointing out incidents where the Taliban’s narrative contradicted its deeds.139 
Taliban-perpetrated civilian casualties were a prime example. The coalition’s 
campaign routinely pointed out that most civilian deaths were caused by the 
Taliban and suggested that either the Taliban did not care about civilian 
casualties (as seen by their actions) or that Taliban senior leadership did care, 
but had lost control of its fighters and was powerless to prevent these deaths. 
Public-opinion polls conducted in southern and eastern Afghanistan in 
2009 (around the time this influence campaign began) indicated only 38 and 27 
percent of the population, respectively, had no sympathy for the insurgency; by 
2013, that number had jumped to 49 and 54 percent, with periods in which it 
jumped to the low 60s in both regions.140 Nationally, “no sympathy” went from 36 
percent in 2009 to 63 percent in 2013.141 It can be argued the coalition’s 
influence campaign was successful in changing beliefs about the insurgency. 
Interestingly, this change in beliefs did not translate to changed behavior in the 
target audience.  
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C. ANALYSIS 
Figure 3 shows an RAA analysis of Pashtun males living in Pashtun-
dominated areas in southern and eastern Afghanistan. Use of the RAA helps 
explain why the coalition’s efforts to change popular attitudes failed to change 
behavior.   
 
Figure 3.  Analysis of Pashtun males in Pashtun-majority areas in 
Southern and Eastern Afghanistan 
The coalition’s primary legitimacy-building campaign focused on changing 
target audience beliefs about the government. Nevertheless, ISAF messages 
promoting the government and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) had an 
overall negative effect on the government’s credibility. In an environment where 
the government and ANSF had only a superficial presence, promoting the virtues 
and good deeds of the government likely contradicted what the target audience 
experienced. As discussed, it is extremely difficult to alter a belief about a 
particular behavior if the belief is based on firsthand experience. In Afghanistan, 
the clash with reality likely resulted in instant dismissal of ISAF PSYOP products 
and a decrease in credibility for ISAF and the government. Any time credibility is 
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lost, it becomes more likely that future products will be discredited instantly. 
Mackay et al. provide a good example of how a billboard promoting Afghan 
security forces did not resonate with many people: 
[An] ISAF road-side billboard, which extols the virtue and loyalty of 
the Afghan National Security Forces, is clearly designed to inspire 
confidence amongst those who see it. This is all well and good in a 
compliant society, one in which the rule of law is the norm. Yet in a 
society where corruption is endemic, where successful passage 
through a check-point will almost certainly require the giving of 
some money, such attitudinal communication does not stack up 
against the pragmatic reality of life on the ground.142 
The influence campaign to delegitimize the Taliban was likely successful 
in changing the TA’s beliefs about the Taliban, but it failed to change behavior. In 
a society where people value familial, communal, and tribal ties, social pressure 
to conform to the decisions made by leaders is very high. The decision to support 
the Taliban was often made at the community level, not at the individual, and 
contravening the tribe’s decision could bring shame and ostracization to a family. 
In Afghanistan, the perceived norm outweighed individual attitudes and was likely 
the leading reason the coalition strategy of changing attitudes was unsuccessful 
in Pashtun areas. This is not to suggest attitudes were unimportant, but that they 
were secondary or tertiary to perceived norms. 
Even if many Pashtuns do not agree with the tactics of the Taliban, their 
distrust of central government and other ethnicities makes support for the Afghan 
government unattractive. The idea of an organization that represents Pashtun 
values resonates with people in southern and eastern Afghanistan; and to 
Pashtuns in those regions, the Taliban is not some amorphous group the TA has 
never seen, but a familiar and forceful presence. It is much harder to demonize a 
group when regular interaction with that group occurs, and any message 
portraying the Taliban as murderers may run counter to what the TA regularly 
experiences.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
This study is another example of influence operations failing because the 
messages promulgated were intended to change strongly held beliefs. Promoting 
the positive aspects of the government did not resonate and contradicted the 
TA’s experience. As we have seen, if a target audience forms a belief from 
personal experience, it is very difficult for any type of influence message to 
change this belief.143 The Afghan case suggests that influence planners should 
not have chosen a campaign that focused on highlighting the positive deeds of 
the government, because it is too incongruent with reality, especially where there 
is little government presence or legitimacy. This type of campaign is more 
appropriate where significant levels of support for the government already exist 
and the desired effect is to maintain that support. A better goal would have been 
to change less strongly held beliefs, which can be identified through a pilot study 
using the RAA, as described in Chapter II.  
The other problem with influence operations in Afghanistan is that they 
were targeting the wrong beliefs to change. The beliefs the coalition was trying to 
change were not the TA’s primary beliefs, so the effort did not result in behavioral 
change. For example, if one of the primary behavioral beliefs the TA has is that 
the coalition and government presence are temporary, it does not really matter 
whether the TA thinks the Taliban is a group of murdering criminals. The opinion 
polls show that the coalition’s influence campaign did indeed change people’s 
beliefs about the Taliban, but those beliefs were irrelevant, at least at the time, to 
whether the TA would support the Taliban. Improving legitimacy by undermining 
the opposition seems not to have worked in Afghanistan. 
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The Lebanese civil war, which lasted from 1975 to 1990, was largely 
fought along ethnic and sectarian lines. The war destroyed the country both 
economically and politically and created the conditions for Hezbollah to exist.144 
With the backing of the Iranian government, this Shia Islamic militant group was 
born following Israel’s invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982, and what started as 
a small guerrilla movement is now a legitimate political force within Lebanon. 
Since its inception, Hezbollah, or “the Party of God,” has supported the Shia 
Islamic fundamentalist ideology expounded by Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini.145 Its goals include the expulsion of Israel and the transformation of 
Lebanon to a Shia-based Islamic republic. Hezbollah has built a loyal following 
by providing popular and essential social and civil services146 and has relied 
heavily on influence operations to achieve political and military objectives, both 
domestically and internationally.147  
The Lebanese Shiites have a long history as victims of oppression and 
have often accused the Lebanese government of treating them as second-class 
citizens in comparison to Maronite Christians and Sunnis.148 Israel’s invasion of 
Lebanon in 1978 to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO’s) military 
structure only added to Shiite helplessness, as it resulted in over a thousand 
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Shiite civilian deaths and created close to 250,000 refugees.149 The 1982 
invasion of southern Lebanon by Israel was perceived as another assault on 
Shiites, even though the stated purpose of the invasion was to dislodge the PLO 
from southern Lebanon. Furthermore, the Shiites viewed the May 17, 1983, 
accord between Lebanon and Israel as an attempt to subjugate Shiites in 
southern Lebanon under a pro-Israeli, Maronite Christian government. Finally, 
Shiites were very dissatisfied with the PLO and especially its military 
performance in 1978 and 1982 against Israel.150 Together, these factors set 
conditions for a pro-Shia militant group like Hezbollah to emerge. In effect, 
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon paved the way for Hezbollah.   
In 2000, Israel finally withdrew from southern Lebanon and, not 
surprisingly, Hezbollah took credit for this development.151 With the Israeli 
occupation over, one of the primary justifications for Hezbollah’s existence was 
obviated, and some began to doubt Hezbollah’s future.152 But rather than disarm, 
Hezbollah affirmed its position as the defender of Lebanon, this time to protect 
the country from future Israeli aggression.153  
B. BUILDING LEGITIMACY 
Obviously, one of Hezbollah’s primary target audiences for influence 
operations was Lebanon’s Shia community.154 In the late 1980s, Hezbollah 
began to compete with Amal, a secular Shia movement backed by Syria, for 
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control of southern Lebanon and its Shia population.155 To gain legitimacy with 
Shiites, Hezbollah, with the support of Iran, began to provide the basic services a 
government would normally provide.156 This included medical care, education, 
water, electricity, housing, vocational training, and the construction of 
infrastructure.157 Amal, by contrast, could not offer these services and instead 
relied on a patronage system where supporters, friends, and relatives of the 
movement were rewarded.158 Amal was soon marginalized and Hezbollah 
became the dominant Shia organization in Lebanon. For many citizens, these 
services filled a void that the Lebanese government was unable to cover and 
helped solidify the party’s legitimacy among Shiites. 
The services Hezbollah provided were extended to non-Shiites after the 
party’s makeover in the mid-1990s into a more pragmatic and inclusive political 
organization.159 Hezbollah continues to offer a full spectrum of services, and its 
ability to effectively provide these services has led to scholars characterizing it as 
a “mini-state” within a state.160 To illustrate Hezbollah’s capabilities, in 1996 it 
rebuilt over 5,000 homes and compensated over 2,300 farmers for air and 
artillery strikes by Israel.161 By offering these services to all, Hezbollah reinforced 
its claim to represent every Lebanese, not just Shiites.  
Beginning in the mid-1990s, Hezbollah began to reach out to Christians, 
Sunni, and Druze populations by adopting a nationalistic platform.162 Unity 
among Lebanese was a motif frequently used to build support, but the party 
knew it could do this only by answering concerns that non-Shiites had about its 
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connection with Iran and Syria. Hezbollah’s messages asserted that all Lebanese 
shared a common enemy (Israel) and that Hezbollah was leading the way in 
countering this enemy and liberating the country. With unity as a theme, 
Hezbollah painted itself in a positive light, posing as the true defenders of 
Lebanon,163 avoiding any mention of establishing an Islamic state, and promising 
that the people could eventually choose their own form of government.164 
Nationalism was the major line of persuasion in this influence operation, and 
Hezbollah propaganda frequently used images of the Lebanese flag alongside 
Hezbollah’s yellow flag. Ultimately, Hezbollah wanted to be viewed as Lebanon’s 
only true freedom fighter. This campaign of unity intensified with Israel’s 
withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, since Hezbollah saw the need to reassure its 
constituents after the Israeli pullout.165 
Hezbollah also employed a version of Poland’s “propaganda of 
success”—its propaganda routinely exaggerated battlefield successes against 
the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and downplayed losses.166 However, unlike the 
communist government in Poland, Hezbollah’s exaggerations did not prove 
detrimental to influence operations. Frequently repeated in international media, 
they created sympathy for Hezbollah’s cause, not only in Lebanon but around the 
world.167 
The demonization of Israel was a key theme in Hezbollah’s propaganda 
narratives and influence operations aimed at building legitimacy.168 Israel was 
portrayed as bloodthirsty and brutal, absolutely incapable of humanity. Using 
images and videos of civilians killed by the IDF, Hezbollah reinforced beliefs their 
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165 Ibid. 
166 Clifford D. May, “Hezbollah’s Psych-Ops,” National Review Online, accessed May 23, 
2014, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/218401/hezbollahs-psych-ops/clifford-d-may. 
167 Mackay and Tatham, Behavioural Conflict: Why Understanding People and Their 
Motivations Will Prove Decisive in Future Conflict, 39. 
168 Schleifer, “Psychological Operations,” 11. 
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target audience already held concerning Israel. These products were often very 
graphic, designed to inflame the target audience’s emotions as Israel was 
castigated for injustice and poverty, and Hezbollah recast negative attitudes 
toward Jews in a religious context, framing conflict with Israel as a religious duty. 
These efforts to demonize Israel resonated with many Lebanese, regardless of 
religion.169  
Hezbollah’s anti-Israel, pro-nationalistic propaganda, along with its well-
received social and civil services, was very effective in building legitimacy among 
Shiites. It had mixed results, however, among Lebanese of other faiths, due to its 
Shia fundamentalist roots. During the 2006 Israeli–Hezbollah war, 80 percent of 
Christians supported Hezbollah, along with 89 percent of Sunnis, and 80 percent 
of Druzes.170 These figures were much higher than before the war, and the surge 
in support was likely because most non-Shiites viewed Israel as a greater threat 
than Hezbollah. Support for Hezbollah dropped after the war, and in a poll 
conducted in 2010, only 12 percent of Sunnis and 20 percent of Christians in 
Lebanon (compared to 94 percent of Shiites) viewed Hezbollah favorably.171 
When the threat of Israel was perceived as very real, non-Shiites were quick to 
support Hezbollah, which was seen to be the only legitimate force capable of 
defending Lebanon. This legitimacy was gained by default, since there was no 
other organization or group in Lebanon that rivaled Hezbollah.172 Non-Shiite 
support for Hezbollah slowly dropped after the war as sectarian issues 
reemerged and reached its nadir when Hezbollah intervened in Syria’s civil war 
in 2012.173 
                                            169 Ibid. 
170 Nicholas Blanford, “Israeli Strikes May Boost Hizbullah Base,” Christian Science Monitor, 
July 28, 2006, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0728/p06s01-wome.html. 
171 Pew Research Center, “Muslim Publics Divided on Hamas and Hezbollah,” Pew 
Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, December 2, 2010, 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2010/12/02/muslims-around-the-world-divided-on-hamas-and-
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172 Blanford, “Israeli Strikes May Boost Hizbullah Base.” 
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C. ANALYSIS 
Considering that Hezbollah is a pro-Shia organization, it is no surprise that 
most Shiites viewed it as legitimate and it is easy to see why Shiites were quick 
to embrace Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. The more interesting issue is how 
Hezbollah was able to gain legitimacy among non-Shiites, albeit temporarily, 
during the 2006 Lebanon war. Figure 4 shows an analysis of non-Shiites before 
the 2006 Lebanon war using the reasoned-action-approach model. Figure 5 uses 
the same model to analyze non-Shiite Lebanese during the 2006 Lebanon war. 
As with previous analyses, the highlighted beliefs of the target audience are 
those identified in published research papers or news reports, and are not meant 
to be all-inclusive.   
 
Figure 4.  Analysis of non-Shiites before the 2006 Lebanon War. 
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Figure 5.  Analysis of non-Shiites during the 2006 Lebanon war. 
The target audience’s behavioral beliefs about Hezbollah did not change 
drastically between the period before the 2006 Lebanese war and during the war. 
What did change was the saliency of the target audience’s primary beliefs, or 
those beliefs they considered when deciding whether to support Hezbollah. 
Wartime support rose not because the TA stopped believing that Hezbollah was 
trying to establish a Shia caliphate, but because that specific belief was no longer 
primary, due to the perceived greater weight of the war with Israel, and was likely 
replaced with different beliefs more appropriate in the situation—for example, the 
belief that Hezbollah was the only group capable of defending Lebanon.   
During the 2006 war, propaganda-of-success type messages, in 
conjunction with demonization of Israel, resonated with the population. Hezbollah 
effectively used self-aggrandizing propaganda and graphic images to mobilize 
people through emotionally resonant appeals. However, this type of propaganda 
did not actually build legitimacy—rather, it was instead used to amplify 
preexisting beliefs as the narrative continued to reinforce Hezbollah’s deeds, and 
vice versa. Hezbollah initially built legitimacy with Shiites through social and civil 
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services the government could not provide.174 The RAA model suggests it is 
unlikely Hezbollah could have gained legitimacy with propaganda alone.  
Self-promoting propaganda proved far less successful with non-Shiites 
after the war. Their behavioral beliefs indicated skepticism that Hezbollah 
represented their interests, and they did not trust a fundamentalist Shia party. 
Hezbollah tried to overcome this strongly held belief by opening its social 
services to all faiths and portraying itself as a nationalist cause. Here, the 
reasoned-action approach shows that even if Hezbollah could change the 
attitudes of non-Shiites, it was still socially and religiously unacceptable for non-
Shiites to support a fundamentalist Shia movement. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Hezbollah has successfully built legitimacy for itself with Shiites through a 
mixture of propaganda (that demonized Israel) and social services that the 
government could not effectively provide. It was not successful in building 
legitimacy with non-Shiites in the long term, due to strongly held beliefs that 
Hezbollah could not be change with its influence operations.  
As in Poland and Afghanistan, self-promoting influence messages are 
ineffective unless the message is congruent with the beliefs of the target 
audience. Hezbollah successfully used such propaganda to maintain legitimacy 
with the Shia population, since their target audience was already receptive to the 
propaganda. For non-Shiites who were not receptive, self-promoting propaganda 
was not as successful, because Hezbollah’s past actions contradicted its 
message of unity and nationalism.   
This case study shows that legitimacy can be quickly built when an 
influence campaign is able to change the target audience’s formulation of primary 
beliefs. As mentioned in Chapter II, primary beliefs form the foundation of a 
person’s behavior. An influence campaign may change a belief, but if it is not a 
                                            174 Lopacienski et al., “Influence Operations: Redefining the Indirect Approach,” 133. 
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primary belief, behavioral change will not occur. The 2006 Lebanese war did not 
cause non-Shiites to fundamentally alter their beliefs, but it did cause them to 
reevaluate their primary beliefs in the matter of supporting Hezbollah. Once the 
threat of Israel diminished after the war, non-Shiites once again reevaluated their 








This study examined multiple non-coercive influence campaigns that were 
designed to build legitimacy for a sponsor at the national level. The preliminary 
research produced two hypotheses, which were put forth in the first chapter. This 
final chapter reviews the validity of those two hypotheses and offers 
recommendations for future influence operations. 
B. VALIDITY OF HYPOTHESES 
1. Hypothesis 1: Messages that primarily focus on promoting the 
sponsor are likely to succeed in building legitimacy for the 
sponsor. 
This hypothesis is rejected based on the three case studies examined. 
Influence campaigns that primarily focus on promoting the government/sponsor 
tend to fail. These cases reveal that people who find the government illegitimate 
are unlikely to be persuaded to support it through non-coercive means. This is 
likely because their behavior is determined by strongly held beliefs that cannot be 
easily changed.  
There is evidence to suggest that these types of campaigns actually harm 
the sponsor’s credibility and decrease its legitimacy. For example, a government 
that struggles to provide basic services to its citizens will lose credibility when it 
disseminates messages that highlight the positive aspects of government 
development projects. Even if the message is truthful, its content is at odds with 
the target audience’s experiences with the government and will cause them to 
instantly reject the message and distrust the government further.  
2. Hypothesis 2: Messages that primarily focus on undermining a 
competing adversary are more likely to succeed in building 
legitimacy for the sponsor. 
This hypothesis is also rejected. The three case studies failed to show 
long-term legitimacy can be obtained by undermining a sponsor’s adversaries. 
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The Afghanistan case showed messages that undermined the Taliban were 
successful in changing people’s beliefs but unsuccessful in building legitimacy for 
the government. In Afghanistan, social norms likely played a larger role in 
determining legitimacy than attitude. The case of Hezbollah revealed that their 
influence campaign of demonizing Israel resonated with most Lebanese but 
failed to gain legitimacy with non-Shiites because of pre-existing beliefs about 
Hezbollah.  
In two of the three cases (Poland and Hezbollah), there was a temporary 
boost in legitimacy for the sponsor when the target audience perceived an 
imminent threat from a group that was perceived as worse than the sponsor. 
After Israel’s intervention into southern Lebanon in 2006, it became very 
apparent to most Lebanese that Hezbollah was a legitimate defender of 
Lebanese freedom. The invasion caused non-Shiite Lebanese, who traditionally 
opposed Hezbollah, to recalculate their primary beliefs and begin to view 
Hezbollah as a legitimate organization, because there was no other organization 
that could militarily counter Israel. Hezbollah was able to enjoy legitimacy from 
non-Shiites while the conflict lasted, but lost it soon after the war ended.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Understand the Target Audience’s Behavior 
Contemporary influence operations fail because planners fail to identify 
the target audience’s determinants of behavior. The reasoned-action-approach 
model offers a well-tested framework to understand human social behavior and 
should be incorporated in designing future influence campaigns. The military 
does not currently have an effective framework to conduct target audience 
analysis, as pointed out in Chapter II. 
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2. Avoid “Success Story” Influence Campaigns 
The United States military has spent tens of millions of dollars175 in Iraq 
and Afghanistan on influence campaigns that tried to build legitimacy for the host 
nation governments by promoting “success stories.” This study concludes such 
campaigns are ineffective in building legitimacy but may be effective in 
maintaining legitimacy. The reasoned-action approach suggests that such 
campaigns reinforce existing beliefs more than they cause a target audience to 
adopt a new belief. Messages will not be credible to the target audience when 
they contradict reality.  
3. Measure Legitimacy by Measuring Behavior 
Measuring political legitimacy is difficult due to its ambiguous definition, 
but for influence campaigns to succeed, it is important that legitimacy be 
measured in terms of behavior and not attitudes (public-opinion polls).176 The 
military’s experience with opinion polls in Iraq and Afghanistan supports this 
view. In the end, what the military cares about is behavioral change more than a 
frame of mind or attitude.  
4. Introduce New Beliefs to the Target Audience If Existing 
Beliefs Cannot Be Changed 
This study suggests that the target audience can be influenced without 
changing their beliefs. New beliefs can be introduced that can cause the target 
audience to reassess whether to perform a behavior. For example, Israel’s attack 
of southern Lebanon in 2006 was the basis for forming a “new belief” that altered 
the target audience’s calculus to support Hezbollah. Because of this newly 
introduced belief, the non-Shiite target audience no longer cared that Hezbollah 
was a pro-Shiite group, because the threat of Israel was much greater. The 
                                            175 Tom Vanden Brook, “Report Raps Military Propaganda Efforts as Ineffective,” USA 
Today, May 13, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/05/23/military-
propaganda-operations-poorly-coordinated-often-ineffective/2354235/. 
176 Fraser, “Validating a Measure of National Political Legitimacy.” 
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target audience’s existing beliefs about Hezbollah did not have to be changed for 
non-Shiites to support it as a legitimate Lebanese organization.   
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
For the United States military to become more effective and proficient at 
influence operations, it needs to be able to identify and modify the primary beliefs 
that make up behavioral intentions. If it cannot modify the beliefs because they 
are too strong, then it needs to alter how the primary beliefs are formulated by 
introducing new beliefs.  Although this thesis focuses on influence operations 
related to legitimacy building, the applicability for its use in other types of 
influence operations exists. This research shows that the reasoned-action- 
approach model can play an important role not only in conducting target 
audience analysis, but in designing future influence campaigns. 
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